HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW by Ivana Radačić
443CYELP 3 [2007] 443-468
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
DIVIDE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Ivana RadaËiÊ*
Summary: Women’s human rights have long been marginalised in in-
ternational human rights law. The public/private divide on which inter-
national human rights law rests has been constructed in a manner that 
obscures the experiences of women and fails to challenge women’s disad-
vantage. 
In this paper, I discuss the problem of the marginalisation of wom-
en’s rights in international human rights law and propose reforms to fully 
incorporate women’s experiences of human rights abuse. The focus of the 
analysis is on the public/private divide and its refl ection in the conceptu-
alisation of rights, the doctrine of state responsibility, and the principle of 
equality. 
The main argument of this paper is that the gendered nature of the 
divide needs to be transcended and the public/private divide re-concep-
tualised in a manner that challenges discrimination and violence against 
women in the private sphere, while protecting women’s freedom of self-de-
termination and personal development in both the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ 
sphere. Such a re-construction of the public/private divide entails using 
gender analysis in interpreting rights, state responsibility, and equality. 
1. Introduction
Women’s rights have long been marginalised in international human 
rights law. Despite the high claims of inclusiveness, of protecting the 
fundamental rights of all human beings, international human rights law 
has been under-inclusive of women’s experiences of human rights abuse. 
Interests fundamental for women’s wellbeing have traditionally been con-
ceptualised as ‘private issues’, outside the purview of international hu-
man rights law. While recently the public/private divide has started to 
be re-conceptualised in a manner more responsive to the experiences of 
women, international human rights law is still gender biased.
This paper analyses the problem of marginalisation of women’s rights 
in international human rights law, explores the reasons for such mar-
ginalisation and proposes reforms to fully incorporate women’s rights. 
The fi rst part of the paper introduces the concept of women’s rights and 
discusses their status in international human rights law. The second 
*  Ivana RadaËiÊ, LL.M. PhD student and part-time lecturer, University College London.
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part of the paper analyses gender biases in international human rights 
law. The focus is on the public/private divide and its refl ection in the 
conceptualisation of rights, the doctrine of state responsibility and the 
principle of equality, since its gendered nature has been identifi ed as the 
main obstacle for the protection of women’s rights. The paper fi nally pro-
poses a re-conceptualisation of international human rights law so as to 
include violations of the human rights of women and thus become truly 
universal. 
2. Marginalisation of women’s (human) rights in international human 
rights law
2.1. What are women’s human rights?
The terms ‘human rights of women,’ ‘women’s human rights’ and 
‘women’s rights’ have not been clearly defi ned, and different writers use 
them in different senses, sometimes interchangeably.1 Most use the ex-
pression ‘women’s rights’ to defi ne women-specifi c violations, that is, vio-
lations directed against women on the grounds of their sex/gender, 2 or 
that affect women disproportionately. The term ‘human rights of women’ 
or ‘women’s human rights’ is usually used in a broader sense to defi ne all 
violations of human rights where the victim is a woman. 
Women suffer different types of violations of their human rights. 
Some appear to be indistinguishable from those suffered by men (eg un-
lawful arrest and detention based on political activities), though even 
these violations might be less visible ‘because the dominant political ac-
tor in our world is male’,3 or they may impact women differently from men 
due to their general disempowerment, and different socio-economic cir-
cumstances. In other types of violations, sex/gender may determine the 
forms that violation takes. For example, the torture of a female prisoner 
very often takes the form of sexual abuse; and the denial of a fair trial to a 
woman is very often based on gender stereotypes or a misunderstanding 
of women’s experiences. In addition, in many instances of violation of hu-
man rights of women, sex/gender is the primary basis of violation. This 
is the case with gender-specifi c violence (such as rape, domestic violence, 
1  Andrew Byrnes ‘Feminism and International Human Rights Law- Methodological Myopia, 
Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalization? Some Current Issues’ (1992) 12 Aus-
tralian Year Book of International Law 205.
2  The term gender has traditionally been used to describe the socially constructed identity 
of women and men, while the term sex has traditionally been used to refer to their biological 
characteristics. However, as noted by many feminists, gender and sex are not easily separa-
ble categories. For a critique of the binary view of sex/gender, see, eg, Judith Butler, Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and Subversive Identity (Routledge, New York 1990). 
3  Charlotte Bunch ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-vision of Human Rights’ 
(1990) 12:4 Human Rights Quarterly 486, 498. 
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enforced prostitution and traffi cking, female genital mutilation), violation 
of reproductive rights (such as forced abortions or sterilisation) and sex 
discrimination. Finally, in most types of violations, there is a complex 
interaction between sex and other constituent elements of identity, such 
as sexual orientation, race, class, religion, and political affi liation. For 
example, while a black, lesbian woman, a member of a political minor-
ity, might be unlawfully detained for political activities and subjected to 
harassment in custody due to her sexual orientation and race, she might 
then be raped in custody, which is a gender-based violation. 
These examples show how gender, as it intersects with other identity 
characteristics, infl uences the form of human rights abuse and provides 
an argument for the idea of inclusive jurisprudence which would display 
understanding of the multiplicity of identities and of the intersectionality 
of discrimination.4 However, dominant interpretations of universality and 
equality in ‘mainstream’ international human rights law5 ignore the mul-
tiplicity of identity and intersectionality of discrimination, which has had 
exclusionary effects. Many of these examples of the violations of the hu-
man rights of women have traditionally been seen as outside the purview 
of mainstream international human rights law on the basis that they are 
sex-specifi c and hence not universal. However, as a ‘universal subject’ 
does not exist in reality, in practice it has acquired a male gender (and 
other more powerful identity characteristics).6
4  The multiplicity of identities and the intersection of different forms of discrimination have 
long been discussed by feminists of colour, lesbian feminists, ‘Third World’ feminists and 
post-modern feminists. In respect of the intersection of gender and sexual orientation dis-
crimination, see, for example, PA Cane ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories’ 
(1989-90) 4 Berkley Women’s Law Journal 191. In respect of the intersection of racial and 
gender discrimination, see, for example, Kimberle Crenshaw ‘Demarginalizing the Intersec-
tion of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139. In respect 
of postcolonial concerns, see, for example, CT Mohanty ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist 
Scholarship and Colonial Discourse’ in CT Mohanty and R Torres (eds), Third World Women 
and the Politics of Feminism (Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1992) and Ratna Kapur 
‘Revisioning the Role of Law in Women’s Human Rights Struggles’ in Saladin Meckled-Gar-
ica and Basak Cali (eds), The Legalisation of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 
(Routledge, London 2006).
5  By mainstream international human rights, I mean the main non-gender specifi c human 
rights instruments and mechanisms which have been given special importance within the 
international human rights system (the so-called ‘Bill of Rights’- UN Declaration of Human 
Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
6  Diane Otto ‘Disconcerting Masculinities: Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of Inter-
national Human Rights Law’ in Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji (eds), International Law: 
Modern Feminist Approaches, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 106.
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2.2. Status of women’s rights in international human rights law 
In mainstream human rights law there has traditionally been ‘rela-
tively little acknowledgement that gender is an important dimension in 
defi ning the substantive content of rights [and] … that a state’s obligation 
to ensure equal enjoyment of a right by women may entail the taking of 
measures quite different from those which may be necessary to ensure 
that men enjoy that right’.7 Gender inequality has been dealt with only 
through the non-discrimination provision, conceptualised in a formalistic 
manner as equal treatment. However, the equal treatment strategy has 
been impotent in securing the enjoyment of human rights by women, as 
women suffer forms of human rights violations different from men, on ac-
count of both their biological and social difference (primarily in terms of 
power). Hence, the only way to make women’s rights visible was to insist 
on a separate body of women’s rights.8 However, women’s rights were giv-
en lesser status and resources, and weaker enforcement mechanisms.9 
In addition, even the women-specifi c instruments have been restricted by 
the androcentric conceptualisation of equality.10 
7  Byrnes (n 1).
8  The conventions that focus entirely or partially on discrimination against women include: 
the Convention on the Political Rights of Women; the Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women; the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages; and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women (CEDAW), which is the most important and most comprehensive 
convention. Of importance are also conventions of the International Labour Organisation, 
and the outcomes of the world conference on women (especially the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action), the Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action, and the ICPD 
Programme for Action, as well as the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women. Finally, it is also important to mention the existence of the relevant thematic rap-
porteurs (most notably, the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences, and the Special Rapporteur on traffi cking in persons, especially in women 
and children of the Human Rights Commission) and working groups.
9  For example, it was only in 1999 that the Protocol to CEDAW was adopted, giving the 
Committee the power to assess individual complaints and to conduct inquiry into gross 
and systematic abuses of women’s rights. Optional Protocol to CEDAW (adopted 6 October 
1999, entered into force 22 December 2000) 2131 UNTS 83.
10  Activities of the Commission on the Status of Women, especially in its earlier days, have 
mostly been aimed at putting women in the same position as men. Even CEDAW, which in 
many respects represents a signifi cant achievement in the fi ght for women’s rights, adopts 
an androcentric standard of equality, frequently constraining its language with expressions 
such as ‘equal rights’, ‘on equal terms with men’, and ‘on the basis of equality with men’ 
(even in the area of reproductive freedoms), and omitting some gender-specifi c violations 
such as violence against women. This has been remedied, however, by the CEDAW Commit-
tee, which has been providing a lead in employing a substantive standard of equality and 
conceptualising gender-specifi c harms and discrimination as human rights violations. See 
Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Femi-
nist Analysis (Manchester University Press, Manchester 2001) 216-218.
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A dual strategy has therefore failed to secure enjoyment of human 
rights by women. Not only was the strategy practically problematic in 
artifi cially dividing people into two categories, but it was also politically 
problematic as it implied that women’s victimisation was not of universal 
concern. It has contributed to the conceptualisation of women’s rights as 
different from (universal) human rights, and therefore of a lesser status. 
Women’s rights have been branded as ‘particular’, while the ‘universal-
ity’ of rights based on male experiences has not been questioned.11 Thus, 
we face a situation that ‘what is done to women is either too specifi c to 
women to be seen as human or too generic to human beings to be seen 
as specifi c for women.’12 
In the 1990s a new strategy emerged that argued that ‘women’s 
rights are human rights’, and proposed gender mainstreaming as the 
‘global strategy for promoting gender equality’.13 Throughout the 1990s 
signifi cant advances were made in the institutions, substances and pro-
cedures of international human rights law as it is applied to women, 
mostly as a result of the vigorous activism of women’s NGOs. At the 1993 
Vienna Conference, it was affi rmed that ‘human rights of women and of 
the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal 
human rights’.14 The Vienna Conference also fi rmly put violence against 
women on the human rights agenda, which pushed the adoption in 1994 
of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women15 and 
the institution of the position of the UN Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women.16 Moreover, at the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population 
and Development, women’s sexual and reproductive rights were fi nally 
explicitly placed on the human rights agenda.17 In addition, the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action initiated the process of gender main-
11  Otto (n 6).
12  CA MacKinnon, ‘Rape, Genocide and Women’s Human Rights’ (1994) 17 Harvard Wom-
en’s Law Journal 5, 6. 
13  Sari Kouvo ‘The United Nations and Gender Mainstreaming: Limits and Possibilities’ 
in Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji (eds), International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches, 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005).
14  ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action’ Third World Conference on Human 
Rights (12 July 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23.
15  UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’ (20 December 1993) 
UN Doc A/RES/48/104.
16  See UNCHR Resolution 45 (1994) UN Doc E/CN 4/1994/132. Prior to that, gender-
based violence was only mentioned in women’s specifi c instruments. The most important 
was General Recommendation 19. CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation 19’ in 
‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2004) HRI/GEN/Rev.7, 246.
17  ‘Programme of Action’ International Conference on Population and Development (18 
October 1994) UN Doc A/CONF.171/13.
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streaming within the UN, which has had some success.18 This is exem-
plifi ed by the adoption of a few gender sensitive general comments by 
the human rights committees, such as the Human Rights’ Committee’s 
(HRC) General Comment 28 on equal rights of men and women (2000),19 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (CESCR) Gen-
eral Comment 16 on the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment 
of all economic, social and cultural rights (2005),20 and the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s (CERD Committee) General 
Comment 25 on gender aspects of discrimination (2000),21 and decisions 
under individual complaints mechanism, such as NL v Peru (2005).22 
However, the integration of women’s rights into the mainstream has 
not been complete. There is still no binding instrument on violence or 
reproductive rights at the UN level. Moreover, these issues are still mar-
ginalised in international human rights jurisprudence. For example, the 
Committee against Torture (UNCAT) still neglects gender forms of torture: 
it has yet to conceptualise sexual violence committed by private indi-
viduals,23 and violation of reproductive and sexual rights (such as forced 
18  ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action’ Fourth World Conference on Women, (15 
September 1995) UN Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995).
19  The comment conceptualises gender discrimination not only as a violation of Article 3 of 
the Convention (equal rights of men and women), but as a violation of each of the substan-
tive rights guaranteed by the ICCPR. HRC, ‘General Comment 28’ in ‘Note by the Secre-
tariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies’ (2004) HRI/GEN/Rev.7, 178.
20  This comment is particularly progressive. It explicitly adopts the substantive notion of 
equality and embraces the use of affi rmative action. The comment conceptualises gender 
discrimination as violation of substantive rights under the Covenant, giving examples of 
particular gender specifi c violations of economic, social and cultural rights. CSECR, ‘Gen-
eral Comment 16’ E/C.12/2005/4.
21  The Comment in paragraph 1 states that ‘racial discrimination does not always affect 
women and men equally or in the same way. There are circumstances in which racial dis-
crimination only or primarily affects women, or affects women in a different way, or to a 
different degree than men.’ CERD Committee, ‘General Comment 25’ in ‘Note by the Secre-
tariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies’ (2004) HRI/GEN/Rev.7, 217.
22  In NL v Peru a 17-year-old girl who carried an encephalic foetus was denied abortion in 
circumstances where it was legally available when the health of the pregnant woman was at 
risk (but criminalised in cases of foetal impairment). HRC found violation of the right to be 
free from torture, the right to health and the right to privacy. HRC, ‘Views on Communica-
tion no 1153/2003’ (17 November 2005) UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003. 
23  For example, in GRB (name withheld) v Sweden, in which a Peruvian woman who had 
been raped and imprisoned by the Shining Path group argued that she faced torture by both 
Shining Path and state authorities if she were returned to Peru, UNCAT found the case to be 
out of the scope of Article 3 since the defi nition of torture in the Convention did not include 
rape by a non-governmental entity. On the other hand, in its concluding observation on 
an Albanian report, UNCAT expressed concern over the prevalence of domestic and sexual 
violence against women and girls and asked the state to adopt positive measures to prevent, 
investigate and punish such violence. UNCAT, ‘Views on Communication no 226/2003 
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abortion and sterilisation, female genital mutilation - FGM, discrimina-
tion against women of sexual minorities) as a form of torture.24 Similarly, 
the CERD Committee is still reluctant to advert to gender considerations 
in its work: it has generally neglected many problems that women in 
general, and women that belong to ethnic and racial minorities in par-
ticular, face, such as racially motivated violence, forced marriages, po-
lygamy, FGM, AIDS/HIV, and employment discrimination.25 In addition, 
despite the ICPD Programme of Action and the landmark HRC decision 
in KL v Peru which stated that denial of abortion for therapeutic reasons 
violates the human rights of women, there is still a lot of resistance in 
accepting sexual and reproductive health and self-determination as hu-
man rights.26 
Finally, still only a small number of cases has been brought by wom-
en, and out of these, only a very small number concerns gender-specifi c 
human rights abuses. For example, out of 151 individual complaints that 
UNCAT considered up until 1 May 2005, only 18 were submitted by a 
woman (out of which two were submitted on behalf of their brothers), 
and 10 together by a husband and a wife.27 Out of 18 cases submitted by 
women, 5 concerned, inter alia, gender-specifi c abuses, such as rape,28 
one concerned the threat of the death penalty as a punishment for ‘adul-
tery’29 and one was related to the fear of persecution for involvement in 
(GRB v Sweden)’ (15 May 1998) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/83/1997; UNCAT, ‘Conclusions and 
Recommendations: Albania’ (21 June 2005) UN Doc CAT/C/CR/34/ALB. 
24  UNCAT’s approach might be changing, at least in respect of abortion policies. For exam-
ple, recently, in examining Chile’s periodic report, UNCAT expressed concern about practic-
es of denying urgent medical care to women suffering complications from illegal abortions, 
unless they confess to illegal abortion and provide information on performers. UNCAT, 
‘Conclusions and Recommendations: Chile’ (14 June 2004) UN Doc CAT/C/CR/32/5. 
25  Center for Reproductive Rights, Bringing Rights to Bear: An Analysis of the Work of 
UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies on Reproductive and Sexual Rights (Centre for Reproductive 
Rights, New York 2002).
26  For example, at the 49th session of the Commission on the Status of Women, Beijing plus 
10, where I was present on behalf of the Croatian Women’s Network, the US delegates were 
insisting for the whole fi rst week that the Beijing Platform for Action should be amended to 
state that it does not include a ‘right to abortion’ or any ‘new international human right’. 
Due to a huge amount of opposition, the US fi nally dropped the proposal, stating that the 
essence of its proposal was anyhow included in the Beijing Platform.
27  For the jurisprudence of UNCAT, see <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf> 
28  See UNCAT, ‘Views on Communication no 226/2003 (TA v Sweden)’ (27 May 2005) UN 
Doc CAT/C/34/D/226/2003; ‘Views on Communication no 146/1999 (ETB v Denmark)’ 
(25 May 2002) CAT/C/28/D/146/1999; ‘Views on Communication no 83/1997 (GRB (name 
withheld) v Sweden)’ (15 May 1998) CAT/C/20/D/83/1997; ‘Views on Communication no 
41/1996 (Pauline Muzonzo Paku Kisoki v Sweden)’ (8 May 1996) CAT/C/16/D/41/1996; 
‘Views on Communication no 143/1999 (SC (name withheld) v Denmark)’ (3 September 
2000) CAT/C/24/D/143/1999. 
29  UNCAT, ‘Views on Communication No 149/1999 (AS (name withheld) v Sweden)’ UN Doc 
CAT/C/25/D/149/1999. 
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the promotion of women’s rights.30 Until now there has been only one 
case on domestic violence, and it was adjudicated before a women-spe-
cifi c body: AT v Hungary.31
This discussion of the status of women’s rights in international hu-
man rights law shows that while certain advances have been made, gen-
der mainstreaming has not transformed the system. International hu-
man rights law is still gender biased. One of the main problems is that 
gender mainstreaming has mostly been concerned with the integration 
of gender concerns into the pre-existing framework of international hu-
man rights law, rather than transforming the framework itself.32 Howev-
er, ‘adding women’ (and stirring) cannot secure inclusiveness of interna-
tional human rights law. Moreover, it may be dangerous in depoliticising 
discrimination against women and precluding further action, as it might 
be assumed that ‘adding’ women is all that is needed for women’s equal-
ity to be achieved. International human rights law, therefore, needs to be 
re-conceptualised to include the concerns, values and ethics associated 
with women. Gender biases must be challenged.
3. Gender biases in international human rights law: the gendered 
nature of the public/private divide
Feminists have identifi ed the gendered nature of the public/private 
divide as the main obstacle in the protection of women’s rights.33 The pub-
lic/private division is the central concept of international human rights 
law, which appears at many levels. The fi rst level is the question of what 
should properly come under the purview of international supervision (ie, 
what should be ‘public’), and what should stay solely within the state’s 
sovereign powers (ie, what should be ‘private’); in other words, what in-
terests should be defi ned as human rights. This has been answered in a 
gendered manner. Reproductive health and self-determination have only 
30  UNCAT, ‘Views on, Communication No 143/1999 (SC (name withheld) v Denmark)’ (3 
September 2000) CAT/C/24/D/143/1999. 
31  CEDAW Committee, ‘Views on the Communication no. 2/2003 (AT v Hungary)’ (26 Janu-
ary 2005).
32  For a distinction between integrative and transformative approaches see Kuovo (n 13), 
citing F Beveredge and S Nott, ‘Mainstreaming, A Case for Optimism and Cynics’ (2002) 10 
Feminist Legal Studies 299, 308. 
33  Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelly Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to In-
ternational Law’ (1991) 85 American Journal of International Law 615; Celina Romany 
‘State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in 
International Human Rights Law’ in Rebecca Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National 
and International Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1994); Karen 
Engle, ‘International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet’ (1991-92) 13 
Michigan Journal of International Law 17; Donna Sullivan, ‘The Public/Private Distinc-
tion in International Human Rights Law’ in Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper (eds) Women’s 
Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (Routledge, New York 1995).
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recently started to be defi ned as human rights, and states are still given 
wide discretion in this area. 
The second level is the question whether relationships between in-
dividuals should fall under the human rights framework. This has also 
been answered in a gendered manner. Traditionally, only the relationship 
between individuals and the state - the ‘public sphere’ - has come within 
the boundaries of human rights law, while the regulation of the ‘private’ 
spheres of family and the relationship between individuals (both in inti-
mate and economic spheres) was left within the states’ discretion. Inter-
national human rights law is still to a large extent focused on the ‘public’ 
sphere. This can be seen in the dominant conceptualisation of human 
rights, the doctrine of state responsibility, and equality. 
3.1 Conceptualisation of rights in international human rights law
3.1.1. First-generation rights
The public/private divide is most visible in fi rst-generation rights, 
which are still given primacy in international human rights practice. 
Despite the rhetoric of the ‘indivisibility and interdependence of human 
rights,’ affi rmed, inter alia, at the 1993 Vienna Conference, international 
human rights practice still gives the greatest attention to civil and politi-
cal rights at the expense of addressing social and economic conditions 
which affect the ability to enjoy these rights. However, neglect of struc-
tural social, political and economic inequalities - from which women suf-
fer the most - means that the primacy given to civil and political rights 
might have adverse consequences for women (and other economically 
and socially disadvantaged groups).34 This is even more the case given 
that civil and political rights have traditionally been conceptualised in a 
gendered (male) manner. 
Political and civil rights have predominantly been defi ned as rights 
aimed at safeguarding individuals from direct governmental interference 
in personal and political freedoms. Underlying the traditional conceptu-
alisation of these rights is the idea of a pre-social rational agent whose 
autonomy needs to be protected from direct state interference. This, how-
ever, is a false and a gendered view of humans, which does not take into 
account the relational nature of humans and the impact of human rela-
tionships on the development of autonomy. Such a view does not include 
reproductive rights and freedom from violence in the private sphere as a 
part of civil and political rights.
34  Byrnes (n 1); Barbara Stark, ‘The “Other” Half of the International Bill of Rights as a 
Postmodern Feminist Text’ in DG Dallmayer (ed), Reconceiving Reality: Women’s Perspec-
tives on International Law (American Society of International Law, Washington DC 1993).
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Indeed, these rights have not traditionally been conceptualised as 
civil and political rights. For example, in the HRC’s early general com-
ments on the right to life, on torture, on the right to liberty and security 
of persons and on privacy, there is no discussion of the specifi c risks that 
women face in enjoying these rights, such as restrictions on reproduc-
tive and sexual freedoms, violence, and harmful traditional practices.35 
While women-specifi c violations of civil and political rights suffered most 
frequently at the hands of private individuals have started to be acknowl-
edged,36 mainstream international human rights law still gives promi-
nence to classical abuses of civil and political rights by state agents.
The right to life - the most important of all human rights - is still 
primarily concerned with the arbitrary deprivation of life through state 
action.37 Only recently have human rights bodies started to discuss the 
denial of reproductive self-determination as a threat to a woman’s life.38 
Similarly, the traditional interpretation, in particular by UNCAT, of the 
right to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and pun-
ishment largely excludes domestic and sexual violence committed against 
women by private individuals, or violations of their reproductive rights. In 
addition, the dominant interpretation of the rights to liberty and security 
of persons and the right of freedom of movement does not address viola-
tion of reproductive rights or the fear of violence or situations in which 
women are held captive by their husbands or relatives.39 
In addition, even though women’s rights are most often violated 
within the family, the right to respect for family and private life has his-
torically been interpreted as the duty of ‘non-interference’ in the private 
and family sphere. The question has often been framed not as whether 
the right to privacy (in terms of self-determination) has been respected 
(regardless of the implicated sphere), but rather whether there has been 
‘governmental interference’ in the family sphere. Eisler has argued that, 
this way, ‘while ostensibly protecting the right to privacy …the conven-
tional use of distinction has served as a means of preventing the appli-
cation and development of human rights standards in relationships be-
tween men and women.’40 The idea of ‘non-interference’ in the private and 
35  HRC, ‘General Comments nos 6, 8, 16’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of Gen-
eral Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2004) 
HRI/GEN/Rev.7,
36  See HRC, ‘General Comment no 28’ (n 19).
37  Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 10) 234. 
38  Rhonda Copelon and others, ‘Human Rights Begin at Birth: International Law and the 
Claim of Foetal Rights’ (2005) 13 Reproductive Health Matters 120.
39  Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 10).
40  Riane Eisler, ‘Human Rights: Towards an Integrated Theory’ (1987) 9 Human Rights 
Quarterly 287.
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family sphere has been attacked by many feminists who have shown that 
the deliberate policy of selective ‘non-interference’ is not politically neu-
tral, thus exposing the falsity of interference/non-interference myths.41 
When the state ‘does not interfere’ in a family context where a man is 
battering his wife and children, the state is actually accepting, if not en-
couraging, the family norms whereby it is allowed for a husband to beat 
his wife and children, and is hence interfering in or regulating family and 
gender relations. The state continuously affects the family by infl uencing 
the distribution of power between individuals. 
Moreover, not all forms of families have been protected from gov-
ernmental interference by international human rights law. As Sullivan 
notes, race, class, ethnicity and sexual orientation all shape the defi ni-
tions of what constitutes a family entitled to protection against state in-
tervention.42 While there is a trend in international human rights law to 
recognise and protect the diversity of family forms and intimate relation-
ships, and the forms of sexual and gender expression,43 the heterosex-
ual married couple is still the focus of international protection of family 
life.44 International human rights law still imposes certain conditions for 
the recognition and protection of unorthodox families (such as cohabita-
tion, or stability or commitment in respect of non-married couples),45 and 
sanctions national prohibitions of certain family and private relations 
(such as the prohibition of adoption by homosexuals,46 or the prohibi-
tion of gay marriages) and the non-availability of certain procedures that 
affect family and private life (such as the non-availability of divorce).47 
States are given wide discretion in this area.
The right to freedom of religion and the freedom of expression have 
similarly often been interpreted in a manner that obscures the different 
forms of oppression of women. On the one hand, the long-held principle 
of non-interference in the freedom of religion, as a private sphere, has 
41  Susan Okin, Gender, Justice and the Family (Harper Collins, Toronto 1989); FA Olsen, 
‘The Myth of State Intervention in the Family,’ (1985) 18 University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform 835; FA Olsen ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Framework,’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 1497.
42  Sullivan (n 33).
43  Alison Diduck, ‘Shifting Familiarity’, (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 235.
44  Diane Otto, ‘A Post-Beijing Refl ection on the Limitation and Potential of Human Rights 
Discourse for Women’ in DM Koening and KD Askin, War Crimes against Women: Prosecu-
tion in International War Crimes Tribunal (Martinus Njihoff Publishers, The Hague, 1999).
45  See, for example, ECtHR, Kroon and Others v Netherlands (App no 18535/91) (1994) 
Series A no 297-C.
46  See ECtHR, Frette v France (App no 36515/97) ECHR 2002-I.
47  See ECtHR, Johnson and Others v Ireland (App no 9697/82) (1986) Series A no 112. As 
Ireland has now recognised the right to divorce (being the last member state to do so), this 
case is now only of historical signifi cance.
454 Ivana RadaËiÊ: Human Rights of Women and the Public/Private Divide in International Human...
meant sanctioning restrictions of women’s sexual, reproductive and oth-
er freedoms in the name of religious customs and doctrines. On the other 
hand, recent endorsement of the state’s interference with the freedom of 
religion in the form of prohibitions on wearing the Islamic headscarf even 
by adult women, on the grounds of gender equality, is also problematic. 
They further deny women agency, and restrict women’s already restricted 
choices.48
The most controversial issue in relation to the freedom of expres-
sion, which has exposed divisions within the feminist community, has 
been the issue of pornography.49 The right has been interpreted in some 
national contexts as the right to make, distribute and use pornography.50 
International human rights law has been silent on the issue of adult por-
nography: adult pornography is not explicitly excluded from the scope of 
the freedom of expression. Hence, as a form of ‘expression’ it is subject to 
the balancing test.51 However, it has generally not been recognised that 
(some forms of) pornography has harmful effects on women’s equality 
and freedom (including from gender-based violence). Pornography has 
generally been seen as a ‘public morality’ issue, rather than as a gender 
equality issue. 
3.1.2. Second-generation rights 
Women’s experiences are also marginalised in the dominant inter-
pretation of social, economic and cultural rights. While these rights chal-
lenge the dichotomy between positive and negative freedom, which has a 
greater potential for inclusiveness, they also embody the public/private 
distinction in a gendered manner. The defi nition of these rights in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR) 
indicates the tenacity of the public/private divide.52 The ICESCR is large-
ly focused on the ‘public sphere’. For example, the defi nition of the right 
to just and favourable conditions of work in Article 7 of the ICESCR is 
confi ned to work in the public sphere (work for remuneration), excluding 
48  See ECtHR, Leyla Sahin v Turkey (App no 44774/98) [GC] ECHR 2005-.
49  See Martha Chamallas Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory (Aspen Law and Business, 
New York 1999).
50  CA MacKinnon, ‘Pornography as Sex Inequality’ in Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 2005); CA MacKinnon, ‘Pornography’s Empire’ 
in Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge Massachusetts, 2006).
51  Freedom of expression is a qualifi ed right, subject to certain limitations. Interference 
with this freedom will not constitute human rights violation if it is based in law and neces-
sary in democratic society, that is, if it pursues a legitimate aim and if there is a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means and the aim.
52  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3.
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much of the work done by women in the informal economy. Moreover, its 
language of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is not very helpful for women, even 
in the context of the paid, public sector, as the sexual division of work 
that clusters many women in low-paying jobs ‘suitable’ for women means 
that there is often no male comparator.53 
Another example of neglect of the gender perspective is the right to 
health, defi ned in Article 12, which does not address reproductive and 
sexual health, despite the widespread problem of restrictions on women’s 
reproductive and sexual freedoms, which have serious consequences on 
women’s health and wellbeing.54 On the other hand, cultural rights are 
often used to justify the subordination of women. Indeed, as Rao points 
out, no social group has suffered greater violations of its human rights in 
the name of culture than women.55 
3.1.3. Third-generation rights
Third-generation rights, collective rights, might seem at fi rst sight 
to be of particular promise to women, since they challenge the idea of 
the individual as an atomistic pre-social person. However, these rights 
also refl ect the gendered (and ethnocentric) private/public divide. This 
can be seen in the examples of the right to development and the right to 
self-determination. Thus, the Declaration on the Right to Development 
(1986) does not contain any reference to women, even though gender 
discrimination constitutes one of the major impediments to development. 
In addition, the Declaration’s model of development is based on the ideal 
of the market economy, with the effect that all unpaid work in the home 
or community, in which most women in the South are engaged, is thus 
characterised as ‘unproductive’.56 
Similarly, the right to self-determination, allowing ‘all peoples’ to 
‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development’57 does not include the right to self-de-
termination of women within the community.58 The right has been in-
voked, and supported, in a number of contexts that allow the oppression 
53  See, however, CESCR, ‘General Comment no 16’ (n 20).
54  Despite this exclusion, the Committee has interpreted the right to health to include re-
productive and sexual health. See Center for Reproductive Rights (n 25).
55  Areti Rao, ‘The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse’ 
in Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper (eds.) Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International Femi-
nist Perspectives, (Routledge, New York 1995).
56  Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 10).
57  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, Article 1(1).
58  Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright (n 33).
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of women. The international community rarely discusses the position of 
women within a society aspiring to nationhood when determining its re-
sponse to claims of self-determination.59
The above discussion shows that the neglect of women’s concerns is 
still present in the interpretation of the substantive rights of all genera-
tions. The interests fundamental for women’s wellbeing are still concep-
tualised as private matters, within the competence of the state. State re-
sponsibility for the violations of women’s rights is still not fully acknowl-
edged. But ‘state responsibility is central to the expansive interpretation 
of human rights law that seeks to encompass human rights of women.’60 
3.2. Doctrine of state responsibility
The doctrine of state responsibility expounds the norms and princi-
ples of state responsibility for an international wrongful act, ie a conduct 
consisting of an act or omission that breaches the international obliga-
tion of the state and that can be attributed to the state.61 The issue of 
state responsibility engages two sets of rules: primary rules which defi ne 
the content and scope of the state’s international obligations; and sec-
ondary rules which defi ne the conditions under which the state will be 
considered responsible for the wrongful acts and omissions (when wrong-
ful conduct will be attributable to the state) and the consequences that 
fl ow therefrom.62 While originally the doctrine was focused on direct state 
action in the public sphere, in accordance with the idea of non-interfer-
ence, the doctrine has witnessed considerable expansion and reinterpre-
tation in light of the conditions of modern life where state agents are no 
longer the sole or primary source of violations of human rights. In this 
respect, the doctrine has witnessed a considerable shift of the public/
private boundaries. However, feminists have claimed that even the ‘new 
boundaries’ are in many aspects closed for women.63 The problem is that 
the doctrine of state responsibility is still not adequately interpreted in 
a manner to acknowledge the systematic and structural nature of gen-
59  Ibid.
60  Romany (n 33).
61  ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session’ (23 
April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 August) UN Doc A/56/10, chapter IV: State Responsibility 
(Draft Articles and Commentary).
62  In other words, primary rules answer the question what obligations the state has, while 
secondary rules answer the question about when the state will be considered responsible 
and what the consequences of fi nding responsibility will be. These, of course, are interre-
lated questions. Ibid para 77, 59-63.
63  Romany (n 33); Rebecca Cook, ‘Accountability in International Law for Violations of 
Women’s Rights by Non-State Actors’ in DA Dallmeyer (ed.) Reconceiving Reality: Women’s 
Perspectives on International Law (American Society of International Law, Washington DC 
1993).
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der discrimination and the role that states play in maintaining gender 
discrimination. This has serious consequences for the protection of the 
human rights of women. 
3.2.1. Bases of state responsibility - the norms of attribution
The secondary rules of state responsibility have originally focused 
only on the conduct of the state agents.64 Only in limited circumstances 
has the conduct of non-state actors been conceived as attributable to the 
states - when the state was complicit in the conduct of the non-state actor 
or in cases where the state subsequently adopted the conduct of the state 
actor as its own.65 However, the doctrine has gradually been expanded to 
include not only state agency, adoption/ratifi cation and complicity, but 
also the failure to exercise ‘due diligence’ in preventing, investigating, 
punishing and remedying violations by non-state actors, as the bases for 
state responsibility.66 Under the due diligence theory, the state has a duty 
to ‘take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use 
the means at the state’s disposal to carry out a serious investigation of 
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, 
to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate 
compensation.’67
However, the ‘due diligence’ principle has not yet been fully accept-
ed by all human rights bodies. For example, UNCAT has not accepted 
this theory of responsibility due to the Convention’s defi nition of torture, 
which requires the act to be committed ‘by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public offi cial or other person acting in 
an offi cial capacity.’68 Moreover, UNCAT has also failed to make a connec-
tion between the high prevalence of domestic violence and state acqui-
escence to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, even though 
so many academics and activists had made a case for it, including the 
former Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women.69
64  For the persons who count as state agents under international law of state responsibil-
ity, see Chapter I of Draft Articles with Commentary (n 61) 63-80.
65  Ibid.
66  For the differences between complicity, ratifi cation/adoption and lack of due diligence as 
bases for state responsibility, see ICL Commentary to the Draft Articles (ibid). The doctrine 
of ‘due diligence’ was fi rst expounded in international human rights jurisprudence by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Velasquez Rodriguez v Hondouras, and has sub-
sequently been adopted by other international human rights bodies. I-Am Ct HR Velasquez 
Rodriguez v Hondouras (Ser C) No 4 (1988).
67  Ibid, para 174.
68  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment (adopted 10 December 1984 UNGA Res 39/46) Art 1(1).
69  Rhonda Copelon, ‘Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture’ in Re-
becca Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (University 
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As discussed by Amnesty International, the responsibility of states 
for acts which impair the rights of women is sometimes mistakenly per-
ceived to apply only when state agents or offi cials are the actual per-
petrators of the acts.70 Moreover, complicity, acquiescence and failure 
to exercise due diligence are often interpreted too narrowly. States have 
rarely been found complicit in the system of gender discrimination and 
violence against women in the absence of clear support or the acqui-
escence of the state agents to these acts by private individuals in each 
particular case.71 The general context of the pervasive nature of violence 
against women and gender discrimination, which points to its toleration 
by the state, has usually not been taken into account when determining 
the responsibility of the state. States have not been held responsible for 
maintaining the social and legal system in which violence and gender 
discrimination is endemic. However, without such contextualisation, the 
right to be free from violence and the right to be free from discrimination 
are empty promises. 
3.2.2. Content of state obligations 
Human rights treaties generally do not defi ne in detail the content 
of all state obligations. The level of detail varies between different trea-
ties. The most detailed provisions on state obligations are provided in 
two women-specifi c conventions: the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (African 
Protocol on Women’s Rights)72 and the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (In-
ter-American Convention on Violence against Women).73 At the UN level, 
the non-discrimination treaties (Convention on Eliminating All Forms of 
of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1994); Rebecca Cook ‘State Accountability under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,’ in Rebecca 
Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives; Rebecca Cook, 
‘State Responsibility for Violations of Women’s Human Rights’ (1994) 7 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 125; Celina Romany (n 33); UNCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences’ (6 February 1996) UN Doc E/
CN.4/1996/53.
70  Amnesty International ‘Respect, protect, fulfi l - Women’s human rights: State responsi-
bility for abuses by “non-state actors”’ AI Index: IOR 50/001/2000.
71  Rebecca Cook, ‘State Accountability under the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women,’ in Rebecca Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: 
National and International Perspectives; ‘State Responsibility for Violations of Women’s Hu-
man Rights’ 7 Harvard Human Rights Journal (1994) 125.
72  African Protocol on Women’s Rights (adopted 13 September, 2000, entered into force 25 
November 2005); CAB/LEG/66.6 Reprinted in 1 Afr Hum Rts LJ 40.
73  Inter-American Convention on Violence against Women (signed 9 June 1994, entered 
into force 5 March 1995) 33 ILM 1534 (1994).
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Racial Discrimination - CERD, and the Convention on Eliminating All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women - CEDAW) have more detailed 
provisions on state obligations than general treaties.74 
The general rules on state obligations are found in ‘general under-
taking provisions’, where the wording usually includes the obligation to 
‘respect and ensure’ rights and to ‘undertake all necessary measures to 
give effect to rights’ contained in conventions without discrimination on 
any prohibited grounds. This language has been interpreted as includ-
ing not only negative obligations - obligations to refrain from violating 
rights, but also positive obligations - obligations to take positive steps to 
ensure that rights are protected, even in the sphere of relations between 
individuals. Treaties generally do not enumerate all the measures, but 
give only some examples. Further guidance is provided by treaty-moni-
toring bodies/courts in general comments on the ‘general undertakings 
clause’ and specifi c articles, the concluding observations to state parties’ 
reports, and the case law.
It is primarily for the state to assess what is appropriate in the cir-
cumstances of its cultural and socio-economic environment. However, 
the measures have to be appropriate and effective, and capable of achiev-
ing the results that the states have committed themselves to through the 
international instrument. The ultimate determination as to whether all 
appropriate measures have been taken is made by the treaty-monitor-
ing body/court. The measures are not limited to legal and judicial and 
administrative measures,75 but include educative and other appropriate 
measures,76 including social77 and cultural ones.78 The duties also include 
the obligations to ensure that individuals are protected from violations of 
human rights committed by private persons or entities. This requires the 
states to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress 
the harm caused by acts by private persons or entities. The duty to pre-
vent includes ‘all those means of a legal, political, administrative and 
74  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(adopted 21 December 1965 UNGA Res 2106 (XX)); International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979 UNGA 
Res 34/180). 
75  CESCR has explicitly stated that the adoption of legislative measures, as specifi cally 
foreseen by the Covenant, is by no means exhaustive of the obligations of states parties. 
CESCR ‘General Comment no 3’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Com-
ments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2004) HRI/GEN/
Rev.7, 15.
76  HRC, ‘General Comment 31’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General Com-
ments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2004) HRI/GEN/
Rev.7,192.
77  CESCR, ‘General Comment 3’ (n 75).
78  CEDAW (n 74) Art 3.
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cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and ensure 
that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts…’79 
However, determining what constitutes positive obligations and the 
failure of due diligence is not always done in a gender-sensitive manner. 
Despite the wide-ranging measures foreseen by the general comments 
of the UN treaty-monitoring bodies, the focus is usually on legislative 
measures, especially in individual cases. In addition, states are some-
times given wide discretion in implementing the obligations which pre-
cludes the proper assessment of the appropriateness of the undertaken 
measures.80 The discretion is particularly wide in ‘diffi cult cases’ where 
consensus on the issue has not yet been established, or where the issue 
touches upon the sphere of ‘morality’ or other ‘private’ spheres which 
states claim should be within their domestic jurisdiction. This is often 
the case with the human rights of women (in particular, reproductive and 
sexual rights). 
Finally, there is still a lack of recognition that measures needed to 
secure the enjoyment of human rights by women may be different from 
those required to secure the enjoyment of human rights by men.81 The 
need to undertake measures that refl ect women’s experiences and status 
are often confused with ‘temporary special measures’. However, as the 
CEDAW Committee has stated in its General Recommendation 25 on 
special temporary measures: 
Not all measures that potentially are, or will be, favourable to women 
are temporary special measures. The provision of general conditions 
in order to guarantee the civil, political, economic, social and cul-
tural rights of women and the girl child, designed to ensure for them 
a life of dignity and non-discrimination, cannot be called temporary 
special measures.82
The problem with the temporary special measures is that the univer-
sal international human rights framework considers them exceptional, 
temporary, aimed only at rectifying past discrimination. Hence, there is 
relative silence over special measures in international human rights law. 
They are explicitly foreseen only in ‘special’ human rights instruments 
79  Velasquez Rodriguez (n 66) paras 174-175.
80  The concept of state’s discretion is named the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in 
the ECtHR. Other human rights bodies have also adopted it, though they do not use the 
term ‘margin’.
81  Exceptions are the HRC and CESCR comments on the equal rights of men and women 
(n 19 and n 20).
82  CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation no 25’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Com-
pilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies’ (2004) HRI/GEN/Rev.7, 285 paras 18-19.
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which are aimed at eradicating discrimination - the African Protocol on 
Women’s Rights, CEDAW and CERD.83 Only the African Protocol on Wom-
en’s Rights mandates them (in certain circumstances),84 while CEDAW 
and CERD just clarify that they will not be considered discriminatory.85 
This brings us to the conceptualisation of the principle of gender equality 
in international human rights law, to which I shall now turn. 
3.3. The principle of equality and non-discrimination 
The right to equality and non-discrimination (inter alia on the basis 
of sex) has been recognised as a fundamental human right since the be-
ginning of the international human rights movement.86 Thus, one of the 
aims of the UN is ‘to promote and encourage respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion’.87 All major international human rights documents 
contain a non-discrimination provision, while some international docu-
ments, such as CERD and CEDAW, are aimed specifi cally at eliminating 
discrimination of historically disadvantaged groups. Still others, such as 
the African Protocol on Women’s Rights and the Inter-American Con-
vention on Violence against Women, are aimed at achieving substantive 
gender equality, being focused at rectifying the violations of human rights 
that women suffer.
The non-discrimination norms differ signifi cantly from one to an-
other international human rights instrument. Some instruments, such 
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child - CRC and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, contain only a subordinate non-discrimi-
83  Both HRC and CESCPR have declared, though, that state obligations may include posi-
tive discrimination against historically disadvantaged groups. See HRC ‘General Comment 
no 18, no 28, no 31’ and CESCR, ‘General Comment no 16’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies’ (2004) HRI/GEN/Rev.7.
84  Article 2(1)(d) states that states ‘shall take corrective and positive action in those areas 
where discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to exist’ African Protocol 
on Women’s Rights (n 72).
85  The CEDAW Committee has, however, adopted two general recommendations on the 
subject. General Recommendation 25 fi rmly encourages states to use ‘special measures’ as 
a strategy to achieve de facto, substantive equality. This lead should be followed by other 
human rights bodies, as suggested by CEDAW. CEDAW, ‘General Recommendation 25’ (n 
82).
86  See for example the 5th preambular paragraph of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the 3rd preambular paragraph of ICCPR and IESCR. UDHR (adopted 
10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III); ICCPR (adopted 16 December 1948, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; ICESCR (adopted 16 December 1948, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3.
87  UN Charter (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 3 Bevans 1153, 
art 1(3).
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nation norm prohibiting discrimination in the enjoyment of rights guar-
anteed by the instrument in question; others, such as ICCPR, IESCR 
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, contain, in addi-
tion to such a norm, also a free-standing, autonomous norm proclaiming 
equality before the law and the right to equal protection of laws.88 ICCPR 
and IESCR also contain a provision guaranteeing equal rights of men 
and women.89 Most instruments contain an open-ended list of prohibited 
grounds (except for the UN Charter, IESCR, CRC) and all include sex, 
which has gained the status of a ‘suspect classifi cation’ in international 
human rights law.90
Most of the instruments do not provide a defi nition of discrimina-
tion, except for CEDAW and CERD. It seems to have been accepted in 
international human rights jurisprudence that direct and indirect, in-
tentional and non-intentional, de jure and de facto discrimination is cov-
ered.91 However, most of the international human rights cases have dealt 
with direct intentional discrimination only. The jurisprudence on indirect 
discrimination has been slow to develop. The European Court of Hu-
man Rights has been particularly restrictive on this matter.92 However, 
the concept of indirect discrimination is crucial for challenging systemic 
forms of discrimination and disadvantage as it ‘directs attention to myr-
iad ways in which dominant standards and more systematic forms of 
discrimination in our society, which are at face value neutral, tend to 
disadvantage or exclude members of less powerful groups.’93
As stated above, most instruments have also been silent on affi rma-
tive measures. It has generally been accepted that they are not prohibited 
under the non-discrimination norm as long as they have an objective and 
reasonable aim, are temporary and do not result in the maintenance of 
88  While the ECHR contains only a subordinate non-discrimination provision in Article 14, 
Protocol 12 to the ECHR, which came into force on 1 April 2005, contains a free-standing 
non-discrimination provision. However, the provision reaches only to the ‘public’ sphere, by 
requesting that enjoyment of any right set by law be secured for anyone without discrimina-
tion and by prohibiting discrimination ‘by any public authority’ (emphasis added). Protocol 
12 to the European Convention on Human Rights, CETS No 177.
89  The right has been interpreted in a manner aimed at substantive equality. See HRC, 
‘General Comment no 28’ and CESCR, ‘General Comment no 16’ (n 19 and n 20).
90  Anne Bayefsky, ‘The Principle of Equality and Non-discrimination in International Law’ 
(1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal 1; Aileen McColgan, ‘Principles of Equality and Pro-
tection from Discrimination in International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 2 European Human 
Rights Law Review 157.
91  Ibid.
92  See for example DH and Others v Check Republic (App no 57325/00) (2006) ECHR 2006.
93  Titia Loenen and others, Non-Discrimination: Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law In-
ternational, The Hague 1999) 199.
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unequal or separate standards.94 However, most of the instruments do 
not mandate special measures. Affi rmative measures are still seen as 
exceptional and in need of justifi cation, even though they ‘are crucial for 
eradicating gender discrimination, for remedying historical disadvantag-
es that women suffer, and accelerating the equal participation of women 
in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other fi eld’, as 
recognised by the CEDAW Committee.95 They should not be seen as ‘an 
exception to the norm of non-discrimination, but rather as … a part of a 
necessary strategy by States parties directed towards the achievement of 
de facto or substantive equality of women with men in the enjoyment of 
their human rights and fundamental freedoms.’96 
 Finally, there is confusion over whether and to what extent non-
discrimination provisions reach into the ‘private sphere’ - whether and 
to what extent the state has an obligation to eliminate discrimination 
and promote gender equality in the relations between private individuals. 
CEDAW, CERD, the African Protocol on Women’s Rights and Inter-Ameri-
can Convention on Violence against Women clearly reach into the private 
sphere, and most of the human rights committees have clarifi ed that 
states have obligations to take steps to eradicate discrimination against 
women by private individuals.97 On the other hand, the new Protocol 12 
to the ECHR seems to be restricted to ‘acts by public authority’.98 In addi-
tion, international human rights case law concerns primarily discrimina-
tion in the public sphere.99
The conventions are also silent on their test of equality. It has gener-
ally been accepted that non-discrimination does not always mean ‘equal 
treatment’.100 Differential treatment that has an ‘objective and reason-
able’ justifi cation and where means are proportionate to that aim is not 
considered discriminatory.101 However, jurisprudence tends to be permis-
sive in assessing the justifi cation. Thus, justifi cations based on gender 
94  Bayefsky (n 90).
95  CEDAW, ‘General Recommendation 25’ (n 82) para 18.
96  Ibid para 14.
97  See for example, HRC, ‘General Comment no 28’ (n 19) and CESCR, ‘General Comments 
16’ (n 20).
98  However, in light of the ‘due diligence’ theory of state responsibility, this restriction 
might not be so severe.
99  Rebecca Cook ‘International Human Rights Law Concerning Women: Case Notes and 
Comment’ (1990) 23 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 779.
100  See for example CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation no 25’ (n 82); HRC, 
‘General Comment no 28’ (n 19); ECtHR, Belgium Linguistics case (App nos 1747/62, 
1677/92, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/93, 2126/64) (1986) Series A no 6.
101  While justifi cations generally concern state interests which are not concerned with 
(substantive) equality, they could, it seems, also concern interests related to pursuing sub-
stantive equality through, for example, affi rmative measures.
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stereotypes - such as the ‘fact’ that at the time when the challenged legis-
lation was passed it was customary for men to be the breadwinners have 
occasionally been accepted as ‘reasonable and objective.’102 The non-dis-
crimination norm may also be breached by not providing ‘different’ treat-
ment to individuals who are in a ‘signifi cantly different’ situation, without 
‘objective and reasonable justifi cation’.103 However, the problem is again 
that the assessment of the ‘objectivity and reasonableness of the justi-
fi cation’ tends to be pretty permissive.104 Moreover, is not clear whether 
different treatment could extend to affi rmative measures. The application 
of all these different tests/theories often results in confusion and incon-
sistency.
The dominant theory of equality in international human rights law is 
the liberal theory of equality, based on the Aristotelian principle of treat-
ing ‘likes alike and unlikes unlike’. As liberal theory sees all individuals 
as equals, under this theory ‘equal treatment’ is a norm, and ‘different 
treatment’ (especially special measures) an exception.105 However, this 
formula is indeterminate. No guidelines are provided for what is to be 
considered ‘equal’ and ‘different’ treatment (when and if it should include 
affi rmative measures) and when individuals are to be considered ‘equally’ 
or ‘differently’ situated.106 As noted by Aristotle himself, the decision as 
to whether two individuals are alike depends on the context and measure 
of comparison.107 
The measure of comparison (in the public sphere of law) has long 
been male. As women are different from men, ‘equal treatment’ might not 
promise them much except to push them into accepting male norms. The 
standard is not easily applicable in the areas of life where women are the 
least like men, both in terms of their biological and social-economic (es-
pecially power) differences. This makes the test diffi cult to apply to most 
and the worst forms of abuses that women face, such as violence against 
102  HRC, ‘Views on Communication no 786/1997 (Vos v. Netherlands)’ (29 July 1999) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/66/D/786/1997.
103  ECtHR, Thlimmenos v Greece (App no 38365/97) (2000) ECHR 2000-IV.
104  In Beard v UK (App no 24882/94) [GC] (2001) ECHR 2001, the Court accepted that 
refusal to give Roma planning permission to station residential caravans on land owned by 
them on account of visual impairment of site was ‘objective and reasonable’. 
105  See, however, Dworkin’s discussion of affi rmative measures. Ronald Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Harvard 1997) ch 9.
106  Functional equality (in terms of the same capability to perform a certain function) is the 
meaning of equality most often applied in litigation, as neither material equality (in term of 
sameness) nor moral equality (in term of same moral worth) are helpful since no two indi-
viduals are the same, and it is generally accepted that we, as humans, all have equal moral 
worth. However, what constitutes ‘functional’ equality, and in which aspects a woman and 
man are alike requires interpretation, and interpretation, as applied by (privileged) mem-
bers of the judiciary, is based on the dominant social norm.
107  Aristotle (trs) Politics (Penguin Books, London 1981) book 3.
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women and denial of reproductive and sexual freedoms. As MacKinnon 
writes, ‘where the lack of similarity of women’s condition to men is ex-
treme because of sex inequality, the result is that the law of sex equal-
ity does not properly apply.’108 Hence the test does not hold promise for 
achieving substantive equality.
On the other hand, the ‘accommodation of differences’ test (as ap-
plied in the still gendered system of international human rights law), 
while better at addressing difference than the equal treatment test, might 
be problematic on the same grounds: its presupposition of a norm.109 The 
test assesses difference and establishes the treatment such a difference 
should invoke in comparison to a standard. Hence, affi rmative measures 
are conceptualised as ‘special measures’. However, defi ning affi rmative 
measures as special may support stereotypes and discrimination of wom-
en as different and weak, in need of special protection. In addition, ‘differ-
ent treatment’ might help to maintain separate standards for women and 
men and affi rm the binary conception of gender. 
This is not to argue that differences between women and men should 
not be acknowledged; it is just to argue that focus should not be on the 
differences from men, it is just to argue against adopting the male stand-
ard. If substantive equality is to be achieved, the differences in power 
have to be taken into account, and measures have to be taken to ensure 
that both women and men enjoy their human rights, but there is nothing 
really ‘special’ in this claim. In addition, for many people being a woman 
or a man is not the most signifi cant identity characteristic, and some 
cannot defi ne themselves as either, and are often discriminated against 
precisely on this ground.
MacKinnon argues that the ‘dominance approach’ is the best suited 
to achieve substantive equality. Under this standard, the question to be 
asked is not the question of difference or sameness, but rather the ques-
tion of distribution of power, of ‘male supremacy and female subordina-
tion’.110 Thus, the question should not be whether there is unjustifi ed 
differential treatment or unjustifi ed non-accommodation of differences, 
but rather whether the law or practice at issue perpetuates or produces 
the subordination of women. This test does indeed seem to be better 
108  CA MacKinnon, ‘On Torture’ in Are Women Human? (n 50) 26.
109  The difference standard has been promoted by cultural feminists, who have insisted on 
women’s differences and celebrated them, arguing against assimilation to a male standard. 
However, many feminists have criticised this stance on the grounds that the ‘differences’ it 
celebrates are the product of patriarchy. See for example CA MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodi-
fi ed: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard University Press, Harvard 1987); and Joan Wil-
liams ‘Deconstructing Gender’ in Hillary Barnett (ed) Sourcebook on Feminist Jurisprudence 
(Cavendish Publishing Limited, London 1997). 
110  MacKinnon, ibid 40.
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suited to achieve substantive equality than the equal/different treatment 
test. It does not require the person to show how s/he is the same or dif-
ferent from the norm in order for the equality principle to be applicable, 
but only how s/he suffers disadvantage and how the law or policy in 
question facilitates such disadvantage. Such an approach brings a wide 
range of problems that women and other marginalised groups face, such 
as violence, violations of sexual and reproductive rights, under the ambit 
of the equality norm. It is not limited to securing treatment according to 
the dominant values of unequal societies, but aims at transforming these 
values to include the perspective of the marginalised. However, MacKin-
non’s test should be modifi ed by the critiques of the theorists of inter-
sectionality of discrimination directed at the essentialism of MacKinnon’s 
theories.111 Hence, in assessing disadvantage, attention should be paid to 
multiplicity of identities and intersectionality of discrimination, and cred-
ibility should be given to the voices of those affected.
4. Conclusion
This paper has shown how women’s rights have long been marginal-
ised in international human rights law. While international human rights 
law has recently started to acknowledge women’s rights as an ‘inalien-
able, indivisible and integral’ part of universal human rights law,112 its 
conceptual framework remains gender biased. Feminists have identifi ed 
the gendered nature of the public/private divide as the main obstacle for 
the protection of women’s rights. 
The public/private division is visible at many levels of international 
law: in the conceptualisation of rights, the doctrine of state responsibility 
and the equality norms. International human rights law is still focused 
on the public sphere: its main function is to guard against the totalitarian 
state. Hence, the types of violations of human rights that men typically 
suffer (in the ‘public sphere’ by state agents) are still much more visible 
than the violations that women typically suffer (in the ‘private sphere’ 
by men). The dominant interpretation of human rights in ‘mainstream’ 
international human rights law is still gender biased. Civil and political 
rights still do not fully acknowledge that the threats to the enjoyment of 
these rights by women are most often sex specifi c (ie that they take the 
form of violence against women or violations of reproductive rights); so-
cial and economic rights still do not adequately acknowledge the context 
111  MacKinnon’s theory gives a one-dimensional account of women’s subordination and as-
sumes the centrality of gender oppression, neglecting other systems of discrimination. For 
a critique, see Kimberle (n 4); Cain (n 4); Angela Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theories’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 581.
112  Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action (n 8).
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of women’s social and economic disadvantage; and collective rights fail to 
acknowledge the context of gender discrimination within the communi-
ties they aim to empower. 
Moreover, the norms of state responsibility are still applied narrowly 
in respect of violations of the human rights of women. Despite the wide-
spread and systemic nature of violence against women, states have rarely 
been held responsible in the absence of direct state action (or omission 
to redress through legal means). In addition, obligations are primarily 
imposed in the ‘public sphere’ of law and the states are given wide discre-
tion in respect of the implementation of positive obligations, in particular 
when they touch upon the ‘private sphere’ of cultural and moral norms. 
Finally, the principle of (sex) equality has been conceptualised in a nar-
row manner. The dominant test of equality is equal treatment (in the 
public sphere). Exceptionally, different treatment might be required when 
individuals are in a signifi cantly different situation. However, it is not 
clear whether affi rmative measures would be mandated (and if so, when) 
under this approach. The main concern is with the equality of treatment, 
rather than the result.
These discussions suggest that international human rights law 
needs to be re-conceptualised so as to fully include women’s experiences 
of human rights abuse and thus becomes more inclusive and truly uni-
versal. If women’s rights are to be effectively protected, the gendered na-
ture of the public/private divide needs to be transcended. The dichotomy 
should be re-conceptualised in a manner that challenges discrimination 
and violence against women in the private sphere, while protecting the 
freedom to self-determination and personal development in both ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ spheres. It is only then that the freedom of all people can be 
protected. 
Re-conceptualising the public/private divide in a manner that incor-
porates the experiences of women would require using gender analysis 
in interpreting rights, state responsibility and equality. Gender analy-
sis would reveal the context of violence against women and their social, 
economic and cultural disadvantage. This should result in incorporat-
ing violence against women and reproductive rights in the interpretation 
of all three generations of rights and the re-conceptualisation of collec-
tive rights in a manner that promotes the self-determination of women. 
Moreover, the responsibility of the state for maintaining the system of 
gender discrimination should be acknowledged. Hence, the state should 
have positive obligations to challenge women’s disadvantage. The state 
responsibility for violations of human rights in the ‘private sphere’ needs 
to be clearly acknowledged. The obligations should not be limited to the 
‘public sphere’ of law and administration, but also to the ‘private sphere’ 
of cultural and social norms, since, without addressing them, patriar-
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chy cannot be eradicated. Finally, gender analysis would reveal that 
the equal/different treatment approach to equality is not meaningful to 
women as it cannot challenge their structural disadvantage. Therefore, 
equality should be re-conceptualised as challenging disadvantage. Under 
this approach, the relevant question would be whether the challenged 
measure produces or maintains (multiple and intersectional forms of) the 
disadvantage of traditionally disadvantaged groups.
